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For cake cutting, cuts are parallel to an axis or segment and yield rectangular pieces. As
such, cutting a cake is viewed as dividing a line segment. For pie cutting, cuts are radial from
the center of a disc to the circumference and yield sectors or wedge-shaped pieces. As such,
cutting a pie is viewed as dividing a circle. This difference in topology is apparent in the
minimal number of cuts necessary to divide the desserts. For n players, it takes a minimal
number of n− 1 cuts to divide a linear cake and n cuts to divide a circular pie so that each
player receives a single piece. Though, there is clearly a relationship between cutting a cake
and cutting a pie. Once a circular pie has a single cut, then it can be straightened out into a
segment, looking like a cake. Isn’t a cake just a pie that has been cut? Gale (1993) suggested
that this topology was a significant difference. This note is to summarize and compare some
of the recent results on pie cutting that appear in Barbanel and Brams (2007) and Brams,
Jones, and Klamler (2007). In particular, the geometric structure presented in Barbanel and
Brams (2007) is used to prove and to explain results in Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007).
Pie cutting or dividing a circle is more appropriate for some applications. For example,
dividing a shoreline between more than two vendors would result in disconnected shorelines
for a vendor if a cake-cutting procedure were to be used (see Figure 1). The circular structure
is also useful when staffing employees (e.g., emergency room physicians, police, etc.) or








Figure 1: Dividing a shoreline with a cake-cutting and a pie-cutting procedure.
Barbanel and Brams (2007), Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007), and Thomson (2007)
are concerned with properties of minimal cut divisions of pies. An allocation of pie into n
wedge-shaped sectors among n players is
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• envy-free if no player prefers another sector to her own,
• undominated if every other possible allocation of sectors either gives the same values
or else decreases the value assigned to at least one player, and
• equitable if all players value the sectors they receive equally.
Gale (1993) asked whether there always exists an envy-free allocation of pie for n players
that is undominated using the minimal number of n cuts. For 2 players, Barbanel and Brams
(2007) prove the existence of an envy-free, undominated and equitable allocation and provide
a procedure to yield an envy-free and undominated allocation. Thomson (2007) also proves
existence, providing a different geometric framework than Barbanel and Brams to study pie
cutting. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) extend Gale’s question to unequal entitlements by
extending envy-freeness to unequal entitlements. They provide a computational procedure
to yield such a proportional allocation, requiring players to know their value functions or
measures. Both the procedures in Barbanel and Brams (2007) and Brams, Jones, and
Klamler (2007) are reviewed below. For 3 or more players, Barbanel and Brams (2007)
provide an envy-free procedure for 3 players whereas Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007)
provide counterexamples for the extended version of Gale’s question for 3 players.
For pie cutting, players’ measures are assumed to be finitely additive probability measures
over unit disk. This assures that the sum of values of the parts is the value of the whole and
subpieces are of no greater value than larger pieces that contain them. Further, measures are
assumed to be non-atomic when projected onto the normalized circumference [0, 1]. Hence, a
radial (border) cut has no value. Finally, measures are assumed to be absolutely continuous
with respect to each other (so that whenever a piece of pie has positive measure for one, it
has positive measure for all). Let player i’s measure be given by the value function vi.
Sectors of pie are denoted by the radial cuts that intersect the unit interval circumference.
Hence, a sector [α, β] with α < β, is the counterclockwise sector between α and β. If α > β,
define [α, β] = [α, 1]∪ [0, β]. It follows that [α, β]∪ [β, α] = [0, 1] so that [α, β] and [β, α] are
complementary pieces. Denote player n’s value of [α, β] by vn ([α, β]). Fro 2 players, refer to
the players as A and B.
1 Pie Cutting for Two Players
Barbanel and Brams (2007) consider the geometry of 2-player valuations:
V = {(vA([α, β]), vB([β, α])) | for all (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]} .
They show that V is closed, symmetric with respect to (0.5, 0.5), and satisfies types of path
connectedness and convexity (Figure 2). The implication is that the line vA = vB intersects
a point on the efficient frontier of V . Further, because of the geometric properties of V , this
point indicates the existence of an envy-free, undominated and equitable allocation of pie
into 2 pieces.
Barbanel and Brams (2007) also provide a procedure to yield an envy-free and undom-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: The point • in the shaded V demonstrates the existence of an envy-free, undomi-
nated, and equitable allocation of pie between 2 players.
their geometric structure. Under their procedure, one player rotates two radial knives coun-
terclockwise around the circumference keeping half the value of the pie between the knives.
After a complete rotation, the other player determines the position to maximize her piece.
Geometrically, as player A rotates the knife, the value achieved by the players for the result-
ing allocation moves along the vertical line in Figure 3. Player B selects her maximum piece,
represented by • in Figure 3. This answers Gale’s question for 2 players. Thomson (2007)

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: The point • in the shaded V is the 2-player valuation that results from the Barbanel
and Brams (2007) moving-knife procedure.
Eliminating the requirement for the measures to be absolutely continuous, Barbanel
and Brams (2007) show that there may not exist an envy-free and undominated allocation.
Thomson (2007) considers different sets of assumptions on the players’ measures, as well as
additional properties of fairness.
Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) extend the problem by considering allocations of pie
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in which n players have unequal entitlements, represented by the vector (p1, . . . , pn) such
that pi > 0 and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Each player i is entitled to pi of the pie. Robertson and Webb
(1998) consider unequal entitlements of cake, as well as the unequal division of discrete,
non-divisible items. Denote an allocation by S = (S1, . . . , Sn) where Si is player i’s piece.
An allocation S is proportional if vi(Si)pi =
vj(Sj)
pj for all i and j. Envy-freeness can be extended
for unequal entitlements: S is envy-free if vi(Si)pi ≥
vi(Sj)
pj for all i and j. In words, this assures
that no player thinks another player received a disproportionally large piece, based on the
latter player’s entitlement. A player i finds an allocation is acceptable if vi(Si) ≥ pi. For
n = 2 players, an acceptable allocation is envy-free. An allocation S is dominated by T if
vi(Ti) ≥ vi(Si) for all i and vj(Tj) > vj(Sj) for some j. For 2 players, an allocation S that is
proportional and maximizes the value that one player receives, i.e., v1(S1), is undominated.
For two players, Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) prove that there exists an acceptable
allocation of pie in which each player receives a piece valued at exactly his or her entitlement,
using a minimal number of 2 cuts (Theorem 1).
Theorem 1. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) For any p ∈ [0, 1], the pie can be cut with
two radial cuts such that A values one piece at p and B values the other at 1− p, according
to their respective measures.
The proof is analytic with a geometric interpretation, requiring some terminology from
real analysis. A continuous function f : I → I has a horizontal chord of length p if there
exists an x and x+ p in I such that f(x) = f(x+ p) (see Figure 4). In general, a continuous
function on [0, 1] with f(0) = f(1) does not have a chord of length p for all p ∈ [0, 1]. The
existence of an allocation satisfying Theorem 1 is related to horizontal chords of every length
p ∈ [0, 1], requiring the construction of a continuous function over [0, 2], instead of [0, 1]. See

































Figure 4: A continuous function with a horizontal chord of length p.
4
Let vA and vB be the value functions for players A and B, respectively. Define x(t) by
vA([0, x(t)] = t and let g(t) = vB([0, x(t)]). Further, define f(t) = g(t) − t. Then, f is a
continuous function on [0, 1] with f(0) = f(1). But, f can be extended to the interval [0, 2]
by defining f(t) = f(t− 1) for t ∈ [1, 2] (see Figure 5). The endpoints of a chord of length
p will be the cutpoints on the radius so that the allocation is of value p to player A and of


































































c c + p
Figure 5: Extending a function onto [0, 2] so that all horizontal chords of length p ∈ [0, 1]
exist.
Lemma 1. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) A continuous function f : [0, 2] → < such
that f(t+1) = f(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1] has horizontal chords of all lengths p ≤ 1. For p ∈ [0, 1],
there exists a c ∈ [0, 1) such that f(c+ p)− f(c) = 0.
The existence of a chord of length p ensures that the pie can be cut at x(c) and x(c+ p)
so that vA([x(c), x(c+ p)]) = vB([x(c), x(c+ p)] = p. The result of Theorem 1 can be viewed
from the geometric perspective of Barbanel and Brams (2007), as explained below.
Of course, Theorem 1 makes no claim about whether or not the resulting allocation
is undominated. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) re-state Gale’s question to unequal
entitlements: Under unequal entitlements, does there exist an envy-free and undominated
allocation of pie using a minimal number of cuts?
Lemma 1 demonstrates that there exists an allocation of pie so that each player receives
a piece valued at his or her entitlement with no surplus left over. Using a variation of the
moving-knife procedure from Barbenal and Brams (2007), a player can rotate two knives
keeping p between the two knives. If player B selects the piece that he values the most, then
he will value it at least as much as 1−p. In general, he will value the maximum valued piece
more than 1− p. Hence, it is possible for player A to receive a piece that she values at p and
for player B to receive a piece that he values at 1− p, but with a surplus piece, as pictured
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Figure 6: Player A receives [0, α] valued at p while player B receives [β, 1] valued at 1−p. The
surplus (white space) can be divided in proportion to the players’ entitlements by cutting at
some θ between α and β.
Theorem 2. Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) For two players with entitlements p and
1−p, there exists an envy-free, efficient, and proportional allocation using 2 radial cuts such
that each player receives at least its entitled share, given the players’ measures are absolutely
continuous.
The proof of Theorem 2 in Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) uses the insight from Figure
6; and, this insight can be viewed as a procedure. However, it can also be proved from the geo-
metric framework of Barbanel and Brams (2007). Recall that V = {(vA([α, β]), vB([β, α])) |
for all (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]} . Then, the line through the origin of slope pBpA
intersects the
ordered pair of values for the allocations from Theorems 1 and 2. See Figure 7, for the
example where player A is entitled to 0.6 and player B is entitled to 0.4. This provides a




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: For (p1, p2) = (0.6, 0.4), Theorem 1 yields ◦; Theorem 2 yields •.
Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) provide a procedure to yield an acceptable, propor-
tional allocation for 2 players with rational entitlements. However, as in Figure 6, the allo-
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cation may not be efficient, resulting in a surplus or left over piece. The procedure requires
multiple moving knives, according to the denominator of the reduced fractional entitlements.
Figure 8 accompanies the description of the procedure.






(Brams, Jones, and Klamler, 2007)
1. Select a point on the circumference of the pie at random. Denote the radius from the
center of the pie to this point as 0 radians (angle 0).
2. Player A, unobserved by player B, marks n−1 additional angles that, together with angle
0, divide the pie into n sectors (dashed lines in figure).
3. Player B places one knife along the radius at angle 0 and places n − 1 knives from the
center of the pie to the circumference at n− 1 angles that, together with angle 0, divide the
pie into n sectors (solid lines in figure).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Players A and B use the proportional pie-cutting procedure for rational-number
entitlements to divide the pie in a ratio of 3 : 2. b) Player B rotates its knives until player
A stops the rotation when knife k4 coincides with A’s angle 4. Player A receives the 3
consecutive sectors counterclockwise from knife k4, and player B receives the pie between
knives k2 and k4.
5. Player A stops the rotation when one of player B’s knives is coincident with one of player
A’s n angles (k4 and 4 in figure), and there are k consecutive sectors in the counterclockwise
direction from this knife, according to A’s angles, that do not intersect n − k consecutive
sectors in the clockwise direction from this knife, according to B’s knives.
6. Player A reveals its angles. The pie is cut in three places: the two radii defining the
boundary of A’s k consecutive sectors; and at the knife that, together with the knife coinci-
dent with A’s angle, forms the boundary of the n− k consecutive sectors, according to B’s
knives (see figure).
7. If A does not call stop before player B’s knives traverse one sector, then neither player
receives any of the pie.
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Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) prove that risk-averse players will implement the above
procedure truthfully. They also view Theorem 2 as a computational procedure in which
players submit their measures. If players are able to articulate their measures, then risk-
averse players will submit them truthfully to a referee to arrive at the envy-free, efficient, and
proportional outcome from Theorem 2. The procedure can be viewed as a referee rotating
two knives, keeping the proportion of the values to players A and B to be the proportion of
the entitlements. If the submitted measures were truthful, then the players will agree that










































































































Figure 9: A referee rotates θ counterclockwise from 0 to 2pi, keeping vA([θ, cθ]) : vB([cθ, θ]) =
p : 1− p.
2 Three or More Players
Barbanel and Brams (2007) provide an envy-free procedure for 3 players (with equal entitle-
ments). They assume that three players, denoted by A,B, and C, have absolutely continuous
measures.
Three-Player Envy-Free Procedure (Barbanel and Brams, 2007)







2. B calls “stop” when he thinks two of the pieces are tied for largest, which must occur for
at least one set of positions in the rotation.
3. The players then choose pieces in the order C, B, and A.
Step 2 can occur because at some point B will think that two of the pieces are tied
for largest. This follows by continuity of the players’ measures and the intermediate-value
theorem. Under this procedure, truthfulness ensures envy-freeness. In particular, C takes
its most-valued piece, B can choose one of the tied-for-most valued pieces, and A values all
the pieces the same. Realize that this does not address Gale’s question for 3 players, as the
above envy-free allocation may be dominated.
8
Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) consider unequal entitlements for n = 3 players and
provide counterexamples to show that measures and entitlements exist for which there is no
3-player proportional allocation.
Example 1. Suppose that the entitlements for 3 players are in the proportion 3 : 1 : 1.
Assume that the players’ measures are uniform over sectors where each sector is equally
valued in Figure 10. For A to receive 35 of the pie, A must receive 5+ consecutive sectors.
However, any 5 consecutive sectors must contain sector 1 or sector 6. Because B values
sector 1 at 45 and C values sector 6 at
4
5 , then B or C cannot receive a piece that it values













































































































































































Figure 10: There is no acceptable allocation in the proportion 3 : 1 : 1.
The above example does not depend on one player receiving more than half the value
of the pie. Consider the following example, in which each of the three players is entitled to
nearly one-third the value of the pie.











where 0 < x < 124 . Assume that the players’ measures are uniform over
each sector and valued as in the accompanying table in Figure 11. It follows that each physical
1/3 of the pie is valued at 1/3 by A and B. Hence, A and B together must get (physically)
more than 2/3 of the pie. However, C must receive more than 1/4 the value of the pie,
because 13 − 2x >
1
4 when x <
1
24 . Because C’s measure is uniform over the entire pie, this
amounts to player C receiving at least 1/4 of the physical pie. If A and B each receive 1/3
(of the physical pie) and C receives 1/4 (of the physical pie), then 1/12 of the pie remains.
To change this to an acceptable allocation, A and B must both receive x of the pie according
to their respective measure and C must get 112 − 2x, according to her measure, from the 1/12
physical piece of pie. But there is not a 1/12 physical piece of pie that is valued at more than
x by both A and B. To be precise, either A or B must receive a piece valued at less than x
3
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for players A, B, and C.
3 Open Questions about Procedures
Much of the focus on pie cutting has been on existence results. However, there are still a
number of open questions about whether or not there exist procedures to yield the existence
results. Although Barbanel and Brams (2007) prove the existence of an envy-free, undomi-
nated, and equitable allocation of pie for 2 players, does there exist a moving-knife procedure
to produce such an allocation? Brams, Jones, and Klamler (2007) prove that there exist an
envy-free, undominated, and proportional allocation of pie for 2 players with unequal enti-
tlements. Their procedure is computational in nature and requires the players to be able to
articulate their measures. This begs the question of whether there is a 2-player moving-knife
procedure to produce an envy-free, undominated, and proportional allocation of pie? Bar-
banel and Brams (2007) provide an envy-free procedure for 3 players with equal entitlements.
Do there exist moving-knife procedures for n > 3 that yield envy-free allocations?
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